Anathema or Nostalgia:

Introduction. The Myth of the “Golden Age”

Today, the issue of Russians’ nostalgia for the Soviet era is relevant again: post-Soviet melancholy and the desire to return to the past are discussed in both scientific and political and public discourses. This discussion has become especially lively in connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the attempt to “restorate” the Soviet era. It is impossible to deny nostalgia for the past, it has always existed in one way or another: each era chose its “hero” and bestowed upon him the title of “the golden  century”, perceived him as an example to follow, creatively comprehended him, creating his own new under the inspiration of the “well-forgotten old”.

According to the general unspoken consensus, it seems that the Soviet Union appears to Russians as that very “lost paradise”, and their political position (conservatism, rejection of democracy and liberalism, anti-Westernism, imperialism, etc.) is dictated by nostalgia and the desire to return to that “golden age”. Similar to the tripartite structure of a classic plot, I distinguish three main myths that make up a certain poetic, almost biblical plot. The first is “the USSR as the best place to live” – a kind of paradise, where everyone was equal, everyone had equal opportunities and free apartments and trips to the sea, the best medicine, education and food, and the Party, like a transcendental mind, solved all problems, there was no need to worry about anything, life is known in advance, like the ancient golden age and the Christian Garden of Eden – time in timelessness. The second is the “tragedy” of the collapse of the Soviet Union, similar to the fall of the first people, who lost their carefree existence and free spiritual benefits granted by the party, in exchange for material benefits, which henceforth must be earned with sweat and blood. And the third is the myth of the “wild 90s”, which embodied both the wanderings of the first people expelled from Eden, and the sinful Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Great Flood, after which, finally, came the stable “fat 2000s”. In my opinion, it is these mythologemes that play an important role in the socio-political information field in modern Russia and are one of the pillars supporting the power of Vladimir Putin.

This project began as a study of nostalgia for the Soviet Union, but in the process of content analysis of comments on the Russian social network VKontakte, I discovered that Russians of different ages experience nostalgia for the late 80s, which corresponds to the Perestroika era, and the 90s no less in quantitative terms than for the USSR. To assess the prevalence of nostalgia among Internet users for the three periods under consideration, the method of content analysis of user comments on social networks was used.

As for nostalgia for the nineties, the fact that it was quite widespread was unexpected: commentators expressed nostalgic feelings towards the 90s and had a mostly positive attitude towards this period. They talked about the new opportunities and freedoms of this period, the development of the automobile industry, television, pop culture, various festivals and concerts of that time. Some commentators noted that in the 90s there was a strong spirit of freedom and democracy in the country, reforms were carried out that made life in Russia better, and that the youth of that time were more conscious and active. At the same time, the comments pointed out the difficulties and hardships that accompanied this period, such as the economic crisis, unemployment, a decline in living standards and an increase in crime. A fairly high level of positive assessment of this time sharply contrasts with the official state rhetoric in Russia and the myth of the “wild 90s”. So, I started studying the memory of Russians about this era.

Research objectives

Why is this important and what is the main problem with the 1990s in Russia? The fact is that in Russia the mainstream narrative is completely controlled by the state, and the government led by Vladimir Putin has a monopoly on working with collective memory. In the official Russian diction, there is an overt and unspoken generally accepted agenda that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,” as Putin said in his Munich speech at the Conference on International Security in 2007. Political analysts and experts see this speech as a factor in the formation of nostalgia for the USSR, since it created the image of a defeated Russia, which must regain its lost image as a strong power. At the same time, against the background of increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, both in Russia and in the world, public demand for security, control and stability has grown, thanks to which further reconstruction of the Soviet Union will become possible. Many people who had a hard time living through the post-reform period saw in the USSR a model of justice and social protection, which they lost in Russia after the collapse of the Union.

At the same time, in Russian pop culture, which lives primarily on the Internet – a space that is more difficult for the state to control, films, TV series, music videos, etc. are constantly appearing that are inspired by the 90s and romanticize the era. A synthetic image of the past is born, as a rule, among millennials and zoomers (born at the end of or after the collapse of the USSR), which includes the aesthetics of both the late Soviet era and the 90s, and even the early 2000s (mainly in the creation of pop-cultural products). Such are, for example, clips of Russian music artists such as Monetochka and Dead Blonde, commercials, as well as the series project “Inside Lapenko” as the main “popular” example of the synthesis of eras of the past into one new image. So, after all, what are the 90s: is it a subject of nostalgia or is it anathema in Russian society?

Thus, the central research question is:

What is the memory and attitude of Russians towards the era of the 90s in reality?

The object of analysis is:

Different generations of Russian Federation citizens.

Theoretical framework

In the information age, when various media, including personal ones, have become not only widely available, but also an integral part of everyday life, the concept of “trauma stadis” seems to me to be the most relevant. The founders of this method Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub ¹ and Katie Caruth ² believe that the basis of historical discourse in the 20th century is testimony. However, over time, there are fewer and fewer living witnesses of traumatic events (in the context of “trauma stadis”, a traumatic event does not necessarily mean pain, it can be any event that evokes strong emotions, exciting, disturbing events), and the need for involvement does not disappear. The second important moment for “trauma stadis” is action: in an effort to compensate for non-participation in a traumatic event, to experience it, a person performs some action, for example, by studying the history of his family or, if the event occurs in the present, by watching photos, videos or online broadcasts, commenting, etc. In this way, a person can experience, participating without participating. Thanks to this methodological approach, it is possible to consider the phenomenon of nostalgia in the younger generation for a country in which they have never lived.

As Maurice Halbwachs ³, ⁴  notes, the authorities that control the media and public memory actively use the mythologization of the past for their own purposes. Contemporary public and political discourse in Russia is focused on creating a “traditional image” of the Soviet past, which should serve as a basis for restoring national identity and uniting the people. According to Halbwachs ⁵ , collective memory is an instrument of power that allows for the formation of national identity and the justification of certain political decisions. By telling a certain story of the past, power influences the opinions and feelings of people, shaping their desires and behavior in the present. However, as Halbwachs emphasizes, collective memory is not a static phenomenon, but is constantly changing under the influence of the social environment and the cultural principles of the group. The past has different interpretations and significance for different groups of people, and each person has his or her own individual memory and experience. Thus, the mythologization of the past has several sources of origin at once: official discourse, individual memory, cultural product, and pop culture.

Hypothesis

Following the above logic, the main theses of the research hypothesis are:

• In Russian society there is a positive image of the 90s as an era of freedom, new hopes, liberal reforms – and, as a result, a positive attitude towards democracy
• The myth of the “wild 90s” is based on the official discourse of the Russian state
• The older the generation, the worse they feel about the 90s
• Nostalgia for the 1990s among young Russians can be broken down into its main components: political motives, a sense of childhood security, pop culture, material objects

Research progress and results

The study included 6 in-depth interviews and one autoethnographic interview in a very experimental way. The interviews involved 3 participants from Generation X (born between 1965 and 1980) and 3 participants from Generation Y, or millennials (born between 1981 and 1996). The autointerviews helped me formulate questions for the guide. The interview guide was divided into thematic blocks, including personal history, stereotypes about the 90s, material culture, popular culture, political and moral assessment of the time, questions of nostalgia and emotional assessment, and significant events. It should also be noted that the interviews were conducted in a free form, following the logic of the interviewees’ narrative, and not the instructions of the guide. The duration of the interviews ranged from 1.5 to 4.5 hours, all interviewees preferred to hide their names.

During the interview, I received a huge amount of information describing not only the diverse experiences lived in the 90s and the assessment of the era, but entire life stories against the backdrop of the era, thanks to which it would be possible to reconstruct the image of the 90s in its diversity.

Nevertheless, within the framework of my research tasks, I tried to summarize the information and draw conclusions. Generation X does not feel nostalgia for the 90s, however, they evaluate this era mostly positively, noting both the minuses and the pluses.

“I’ll say right away – there is no nostalgia. Would I like to go back to the 90s? No. It was hard. But still, it was a fun time, then a new “window to Europe” began to open, we realized that we finally took a breath of fresh air.” ⁶

Generation Y often feels nostalgia for the 90s and evaluates the era positively. “Honestly, the 90s are better than now. Well, I mean, I know that for many it was probably a terrible time without money and work, but then it seemed like there was a feeling that things would get better and better. And now – one continuous hopelessness… It’s as if the old people decided to drop a concrete slab on us, the young ones.” ⁷

Material culture is a tool of nostalgia for millennials, but not for generation X. Generation X does not try to aestheticize the 90s, while millennials actively create and participate in nostalgic themed publics on social networks, buy items from the 90s, for example, clothes of a certain style, Tamagotchi and other “things”. “No, I don’t keep anything. Well, although I do have my very first mobile phone, there is a story associated with it – I keep it as a memory. By the way, it still works … Fashion – no, I don’t buy anything” ⁸ .. “Oh yes, I generally love the 90s style, it’s good that it is in trend now. In general, I love vintage and retro, I love second-hand stores, vintage clothes of excellent quality … I recently bought a rainbow-colored spring, like from childhood. I don’t know why, I need it. I also want a Tamagotchi” ⁹. Millennials are also the most active consumers of pop culture associated with the 90s, this is a trend. Millennials themselves are also the producers of pop culture products.

Millennials are more politicized than Gen X, and tend to see the 90s as a preferable political model as a return to democratic reforms. “In general, ideally, everything should be rolled back, returned to that stage and started again from there… Well, that is, we need to return the old Constitution (note: 1993) without options. And all sorts of ugly laws should be repealed.” ¹⁰

Generation X assess the 90s as a time of missed opportunities, which were finally lost after 2014. “A time of missed opportunities. You see, Vera, it’s like with that grant: yes, we went, the money was spent, but there are no results.” ¹¹

None of the two generations showed signs of collective historical trauma associated with the collapse of the USSR, which is the direct opposite of the official state discourse. “It fell apart – and that’s good. Personally, I would not want to live like my grandmother told me.” ¹⁰ “Not really, everything was going on in the background. I remember how they showed on TV how the Soviet flag was lowered.” ¹¹ Almost everyone assessed the 90s with the epithets “free” and “new opportunities”, not a single interviewee used the epithet “wild”, “gangster”, “beggar”, which does not correspond to the common stereotypes about the 90s.

And one of the most important conclusions obtained during the interviews is the concept of the “long 90s”. For the respondents, the 90s, defined as a time of openness to the world and freedom, do not end with the advent of the millennium. According to various estimates of the interviewees, they continued both until the end of the 2000s and until 2014, when the annexation of Crimea occurred. This allows us to consider the era more broadly in further research.

Thus, returning to the biblical mythologemes proposed at the beginning of the text, I conclude that their existence and ubiquity are quite controversial. None of the interviewees showed signs of idealizing the “lost paradise” of the USSR and the trauma of the “fall” – the collapse of the Soviet state. The 90s do not seem like a terrible time given as punishment for betraying the ideals of communism, but appear as a contradictory, but full of hope and unique new experience era with its own advantages and disadvantages.

Future discussion

This work contains many shortcomings and gaps, in particular, it does not answer whether the trauma of the collapse of the USSR actually exists? How does it coexist with other supposed traumas in collective and individual memory: the memory of the Great Terror, collectivization, famines in the Volga region and other regions, World War II, the transformation crisis, etc.? Is there a certain image of the desired future in Russian society at the moment?

I should note that this is only one stage of my research, I have many questions for further work:

What does the so-called “Soviet generation” think about the 90s and does the so-called “Soviet generation” feel nostalgic What is the image of the 90s among the generation of Russians who did not experience the 90s even as children? How is trauma expressed in different generations and what is the subject of trauma? Why does the “Post-Soviet Generation” romanticize the 90s and find this era so inspiring? To what extent is the image and attitude towards the 90s an indicator of political and ideological preferences in Russian society?