Abstract
This paper explores the role of social media in shaping Matteo Salvini’s populist political branding as Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Infrastructure and Transport and Leader of the political party known as Legue. Through a critical analysis of Salvini’s online presence, the study identifies key strategies he employs to resonate with the electorate through the “Meno Europe, Più Italia” post series before European Elections of 2024. These include leveraging nationalism, Euroscepticism, and a “celebrity politician” persona, which he bolsters through anti-immigrant and anti-elite rhetoric. By examining how Salvini’s use of social media amplifies these messages, this study highlights the growing influence of digital platforms in populist politics. Ultimately, the paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on populism by offering insights into how contemporary rightwing leaders use social media to foster political identity and mobilize support.
Introduction
The rising tendency in support of right-wing populist government is the 21st century can be observed in Western democracies, especially in Italy. However, there are a lot of different tools that are implemented to navigate through the populist approach and build a high-quality political brand. This article seeks to interconnect those tools to critically analyse the case of Matteo Salvini, current Deputy Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, whose political branding is strategically designed to resonate broadly with the Italian electorate through a combination of populism, nationalism and personal charisma. His brand utilises multiple elements to create a unique and compelling identity that lines up with his political objectives. The impact of populist narrative on audience perception, interpretation, opinion formation, and decision-making processes concerning current information is a topic of considerable scholarly interest. These narratives play a pivotal role in shaping and refining acceptable discourses, ideas, and viewpoints surrounding political and social issues, employing various tools of propaganda. And one of the most relevant tools for the modern world is social media communication, that does not only give an opportunity to build a political brand but also share personal life to relate to the potential electorate. Additionally, if traditional media such as TV, radio and newspapers are targeting senior citizens, new types of communication through social media approach the younger population— the future electorate force, by building up a certain archetype, creating an identity or image that would correspond with audience’s expectation.
Populism: Definitions and Characteristics
It is still difficult to give a precise definition to populism, since this form of political communication is complex and includes many aspects. However, populism as a phenomenon is experiencing a shift from defining populism to defining the methods of communication within populism, so de Vreese et al. (2018) argue that the phenomenon itself is no longer linked to particular party, whether it is right-wing or left-wing. The phenomenon itself was defined in different ways in the academic literature. Populism is a thin-centred (Mudde, 2004) ideology that goes hand in hand with the strict black and white division of the world. Moreover, Meirowitz’s (2005) “(strategic) ambiguity” and Laclau’s (2005) “empty signifier” represent that “the People” are intentionally not fully defined or characterised to allow as many people as possible to unite under one label by creating “the People’s” social identity and evoke a sense of belonging. “The Others” here is used to define the out-group or exit groups, usually opposing to “the People” by highlighting the difference between these groups and “evolving” identity. According to the Social Identities Theory proposed by Turner, Brown and Tajfel, collective identity is formed based on its membership in that group, thus, develops self-categorisation: favouritism of the group over out-groups (1979). There are two different ways that populist leaders define the “People” and their relationship to “others”: inclusionary (predominantly in Latin America) and exclusionary (predominantly in Europe) populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). While Latin Amrtican inclusionary populism tends to integrate marginalised groups into the political process, aims to redistribute resources, and focuses on social justice, European exclusionary populism promotes nativism, cultural homogeneity, and opposes international elites such as the European Union and cultural elites (e.g. intellectuals).
Moreover, populist communication includes a set of key characteristics and ideology (peoplecentrism, anti-elitism), or a particular presentation of style elements. According to Jagers and Walgrave, there are four types of populism: empty populism (referencing solely to “the people”), excluding populism (referencing to “the people” with exclusion of groups), anti-elitist populism (referencing to the people within the discourse against elites) and complete populism that combines all other types (2007). This ideational approach creates a dichotomy between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” creating a Manichaean worldview.
However, populism was also theorised as a political strategy by Kurt Weyland (2001) and later developed by Kenneth M. Roberts (2006), mainly focusing on and initially applied to understand populism in the context of Latin America. This approach includes direct appeal to the “People”, charismatic leadership, anti-institutionalism, and top-down mobilisation. Even though Weyland and Roberts focused on Latin American populism, this political strategy approach is applicable globally and can be adapted across different cultural and political contexts (e.g. Donald Trump in the US, Victor Orbán in Hungary, or Rodrigo Duterte in Philippines).
Populism also can be viewed as a political style, focusing on the performative and communicative dimension of populist leaders, rather than its ideological or strategic aspects. Moffitt (2016) characterises key aspects as performative leadership (adopted public persona, dramatic/theatrical performance), appealing to “the People”, mediatization (as a platform to bypass mainstream media), crisis or threat (portraying a current regime as broken or exploiting internal/external threat to adopt the role of the “protector”).
As a communication style, populism is widely spread through different media. Over the past decade, the dominance of traditional news outlets has been challenged by the explosive growth of social media platforms, which have become crucial channels for both social interaction and news dissemination. While social media shares some functions with traditional media, such as framing issues and shaping public perceptions, its fundamental nature revolves around not only passive content consumption, but content generation, collaboration and active interaction. This shift empowers individuals to actively engage in shaping narratives and participating in discourse. Moreover, the unique dynamics of social media have facilitated the emergence of new forms of political action, both online and offline, leading to discussions of internet-enabled and connective movements.
“Meno Europa, Più Italia”: the EU vs Salvini
For instance, the phenomenon of the “celebrity politician” emerged, as new types of media became available. Starita and Trill (2022) suggests that politicians “adopt the practices of media celebrities to secure the support of their constituents” referring to Street’s (2004) definition of celebrity politician who is “an elected official who adopts the style of a celebrity to boost their public image or a former celebrity who uses their status for political gain”. However, due to growing interactivity, perceived intimacy, and populist strategies the shift between “celebrity politician” and “political influencer” took place.
In case of Matteo Salvini, he often portrays himself as an advocate for common people, positioning himself against political and/or economic elites, bureaucrats, and immigrants, stressing issues like economic struggle, safety, and cultural identity. In theory, “the people” as a component of populist discourse, refers to a group of people/citizens, or society. The narrative might be national, ethnic, regional, or even religious (Aalberg et al., 2016), where national and ethical narratives focus on anti-immigration and sovereignty, including Salvini’s strong Euroscepticism.
His political agenda is highly visible through his posts and captions. On one of the most recent and prominent examples are “Meno Europa, Più Italia” (Less Europe, More Italy) post series that involves hyperbolisation, catchy headlines, straightforward and simplified communication. This series of posts is based on the juxtaposition of the European Union and Italy, and is accompanied by captions in the run-up to the European Parliament elections, which took place in Italy from 8 to 9 June 2024.The following examples of posts are only a selection of the available images, but all of them epitomise the main political values and strategies of Matteo Salvini as leader of Lega per Salvini Primer (eng. League for Salvini Premier), former Lega Nord, or Lega (eng. Northern League, or League) political party. One of the most innocuous examples is the post criticizing the new EU directive requiring plastic caps to be attached to bottle necks to minimise waste and optimise recycling. This is a very exaggerated image (Fig. 1) of the cap looking upwards, making the bottle uncomfortable to use. It is important to note that the choice of such an obvious item as a bottle is not a coincidence, as it is what most people use on a daily basis. In this way this image evokes familiar emotions and shows his audience that he can relate to them. Thus, he also criticises the EU regulations on mitigation measures and does not want them to be applied in Italy.
Also the issue of ecology and eco-activism is touched upon in his post (Fig.2), where Salvini exposes climate change activists during the Ultima Generazione (The Last Generation) protest as vandals after they sprayed orange (washable) paint on Maurizio Cattelan’s sculpture “Love” in Piazza Affari (la Repubblica, 2023). At the same time, he manipulates the sense of patriotism and the value of Italian art by using a sharp dichotomy of influence on public appeal.
He conflates eco-activism with extremism, while in the second part of the post he depicts young people helping to clean up the city after the flood, showing them as loyal and responsible citizens. His political message again focuses on localism, nationalism and Euroscepticism.This method also seeks to galvanise support among voters who favour stability and are wary of radical changes.
The third image (Fig.3) is a direct statement against immigrants, painting them as radicalised, dangerous and destructive of local values and culture. The caption under one of these posts reads “❌ Un’Europa islamizzata che cancella le sue radici? No,grazie. ✅ Sì a libertà e diritti per donne e ragazze! Per PIÙ ITALIA 🇮🇹 e meno Europa, scegli la Lega. MENO 14 #8e9giugnovotoLega” (translated ❌ An Islamized Europe that erases its roots? No thank you. ✅ Yes to freedom and rights for women and girls! For MORE ITALY 🇮🇹 and less Europe, choose the League. MINUS 14 #8and9junevoteforLega). Salvini takes a firm stance against immigrants, most often Muslims. Ruzza and Fella describe ethno-populism within Lega Nord (a former name of Lega) as one that “pits a homogenous northern Italian people against the migrant outsider (and most insidiously, the Muslim migrant), who poses a threat to the identity and cohesion of the community, and also a threat in terms of security and access to economic wealth and resources.”(2011). However, according to Conti, Marangoni, and Verzichelli, the party has changed its trajectory in 2013 (on the same year Salvini became its leader) from ethno-regionalist to Neo-nationalist with strong eurosceptic narrative that helped them to get more support in Southern Italy.
Thus, Salvini’s main reasoning, reinforced by his nationalist agenda, is presented in the form of a fear of the disappearance of Italian cultural specificities, including religious foundations, rather than simple regional sentiments. These fears particularly target a certain segment of the population who have more traditional values, manipulating their anxieties through the use of hyperbolised visual symbols. At the same time, Salvini reinforces this by contrasting Italian national identity and independence from ‘imposed’ European Union influences. In addition, the phrase in his caption regarding women’s right has a dual purpose, positioning Salvini as a defender of women’s rights, criticising traditional Islamic values, as well as appealing to liberal voters, as if sharing their values.
Salvini’s next post, however, is not particularly embedded with the values of feminism. There (Fig.4) he expresses support for traditional family values, prioritising and idealising them. This case only reinforces the heteronormative narrative, excluding and marginalising different family structures and identities. In his publication, Salvini places a picture of a bearded woman that can be interpreted as a provocative or symbolic choice that intended to evoke immediate reaction, mostly discomfort or concern to criticise what he considers being a European liberal. At the root of the extreme contrast with the traditional and heteronormative values that the picture in the second part of the collage represents is the message of an alleged threat from these same values. It is important to recognise the gender expression is diverse, and some individuals might express themselves in ways that do not align with traditional gender norms, including facial hair due to medical conditions such as polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS), or as a form of gender expression. In addition to that, it might be seen that the pictures that are used by Salvini are AI generated that manipulates the reality. If the first picture was generated with the intention to stir emotions, using AI for the second picture does not correspond to his message about the preservation of traditional Italian family.
Furthermore, Antonio Martella while analysing the social media pages of different Italian politicians (Twitter and Facebook) in the 2018 election campaign used different categories such as communicative strategies, register, etc. to find out the main communicative style adopted by politicians, including Matteo Salvini (2018). The result showed that Salvini adapts a ‘negative campaigner’ style, especially towards oppositionists (4%) or migrants (11%). Likewise, in study
of Matteo Salvini’s Twitter account between 16 June and 16 September 2019 conducted by Loner and Berti, the politician’s populist style was identified as ‘character assassination’ (2021). Thus 13.5% of tweets (146 out of 1426) were defined as ‘character assassination targeting one or more people’, which included comments against individual citizens, on political rivalry, non-govermental organisations, the EU and etc. A good example of this is the picture posted by Salvini (Fig.5), which shows different politicians: The first half of the Meno Europa part shows Ursula von der Leyen (President of the European Commission), Ilaria Salis (Italian politician, activist and teacher elected to the European Parliament), Giuseppe Conte (former Italian Prime Minister), Aboubakar Soumahoro (Ivaro-Italian trade unionist and politician known for his activism in defence of migrant workers), Laura Boldrini (Italian politician and former president of the Chamber of Deputiesies), Elly Schlein (Italian politician known for her progressive views, especially on social justice and environmental issues), Emmanuel Macron (President of France); the second part of the photograph, entitled “Più Italia”, shows Matteo Salvini himself shaking hands hands with Roberto Vannacci (Italian general, MEP). i.e. Salvini contrasts his political opponents, or civic activists/public figures with opposing views, calling them “Misses Know-It-All and technocratic schoolteachers, friends of illegal immigrants, social centres, eco-nuts and slackers, armchair leftists and assorted ‘gender-fluid’, trigger happy leaders”.
While General Vannacci, who was a candidate for the elections (at the time of publication of the post) of the European Parliament from the Lega (eng. League) was described as a defender “of homes, cars, savings, work, products, borders, security, family, history and identity of ITALIANS” stating “no more war, yes to PEACE for the future of our children”.
Given the long history of Italian gastronomic traditions, food can also be politicised. Starita (2022) argues that populist leaders utilise food as “a symbol connected to conservative, right-wing political values” and ties this term to gastropopulism. Results shows that political leaders such as Matteo Salvini and Georgia Meloni use locally produced, fresh products, beverages (espresso/cappuccino), traditional desserts/pastries, and other objects of Italian cuisine.
The Fig.6, posted right after the European Elections demonstrates a burger with worms, crickets and grasshoppers, and an Italian sandwich (panino), accompanied with a glass of red wine. Visual contrast is a supporting element, along with the headline and caption below the post. Salvini not only criticises ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ by contrasting them with Italian traditional culture, but also utilisises what can be classified as an example of exclusive populism. He defines ‘people’ with those associated with Italian culture, but the ‘other’ bureaucrats, veins and non-Italians are presented as a threat.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this research underscores the pivotal role of social media in Matteo Salvini’s political branding and its contribution to his rise as a leading figure in right-wing populism. Through carefully curated content, Salvini successfully taps into nationalist sentiment, exploits fears surrounding immigration, and positions himself as a defender of traditional Italian values. The use of social media not only allows him to bypass traditional media channels but also enables direct engagement with his followers, thereby reinforcing his populist narrative. These findings suggest that populist leaders’ reliance on social media will likely increase as they continue to adapt to the evolving digital landscape. Future research could explore how similar tactics are being employed by other populist leaders worldwide, further examining the intersection between political communication, social media, and populism in different contexts.
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